Incidental perceptual memory tests reveal priming when words are generated orally from a semantic cue at study, and this priming could reflect contamination by voluntary retrieval. We tested this hypothesis using a generate condition and two read conditions that differed in depth of processing (read-phonemic vs read-semantic). An intentional word-stem completion test showed an advantage for the read-semantic over the generate condition and an advantage for the generate over the read-phonemic condition, and completion times were longer than in a control (...) test, prior to which there was no study phase. An incidental word-stem completion test showed equivalent priming for the read-semantic and read-phonemic study conditions, despite considerable power, and completion times were no longer than control, indicating that retrieval was involuntary, and insensitive to prior conceptual processing. The generate condition produced less priming than the read conditions, but significant priming nonetheless. The results show that priming from generating can be involuntary and suggest that lexical processes are responsible. They are also the first results conjointly showing a crossed double dissociation, a single dissociation, and a parallel effect across memory tests with identical physical retrieval cues. (shrink)

How do people make difficult decisions in situations involving substantial risk and uncertainty? In this study, we presented a difficult medical decision to three expert physicians in a combined “thinking aloud” and “cross examination” experiment. Verbatim transcripts were analyzed using script analysis to observe the process of constructing and making the decision, and using referring phrase analysis to determine the representation of knowledge of likelihoods. These analyses are compared with a formal decision analysis of the same problem to highlight similarities (...) and differences. The process of making the decision resembles an incremental, sequential‐refinement planning algorithm, where a complex decision is broken into a sequence of choices to be made with a simplified description of the alternatives. This strategy results in certain kinds of relevant information being underweighted in the final decision. Knowledge of likelihood appears to be represented as symbolic descriptions capturing categorical and ordinal relations with “landrhark” likelihoods, only some of which are described numerically. Numerical probabilities, capable of being combined and compared arithmetically, were not observed. These observations suggest an explanation for the heuristics and biases in human decision making under uncertainty in terms of the processes that manipulate symbolic descriptions of likelihoods and construct plans of action for situations involving risk and uncertainty. (shrink)

Patients with end-stage renal disease experience significant mortality and morbidity, including cognitive decline. Advance care planning has been emphasized as a responsibility and priority of physicians caring for patients with chronic kidney disease in order to align with patient values before decision-making capacity is lost and to avoid suffering. This emphasis has proven ineffective, as illustrated in the case of a patient treated in our hospital. Is this ineffectiveness a consequence of failure in the courtroom or the clinic? Through our (...) own experience we affirm what has been written before: that legal precedent favors intensive treatment in virtually all cases without ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a patient’s previously declared wishes to the contrary. Equally clear is that more than 20 years of support in the clinical literature suggesting advance care planning early in the course of disease can address challenges in the legal system for those lacking capacity. However, many physicians fail t... (shrink)

Déjà vu is the striking sense that the present situation feels familiar, alongside the realization that it has to be new. According to the Gestalt familiarity hypothesis, déjà vu results when the configuration of elements within a scene maps onto a configuration previously seen, but the previous scene fails to come to mind. We examined this using virtual reality technology. When a new immersive VR scene resembled a previously-viewed scene in its configuration but people failed to recall the previously-viewed scene, (...) familiarity ratings and reports of déjà vu were indeed higher than for completely novel scenes. People also exhibited the contrasting sense of newness and of familiarity that is characteristic of déjà vu. Familiarity ratings and déjà vu reports among scenes recognized as new increased with increasing feature-match of a scene to one stored in memory, suggesting that feature-matching can produce familiarity and déjà vu when recall fails. (shrink)

Research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) has tended to focus on external stakeholders and outcomes, revealing little about internal effects that might also help explain CSR-firm performance linkages and the impact that corporate marketing strategies can have on internal stakeholders such as employees. The two studies ( N = 1,116 and N = 2,422) presented in this article draw on theory from both corporate marketing and organizational behavior (OB) disciplines to test the general proposition that employee trust partially mediates the (...) relationship between CSR and employee attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Both studies provide evidence in support of these general relationships. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed in the context of CSR and corporate marketing research. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 98 Heft: 1 Seiten: 302-309.

Many moral theorists argue that the concept of moral wrongness is connected to, and can be understood in terms of, the concept of blameworthiness. This tradition has its earliest roots in Mill’s Utilitarianism, and can be found in the work of, among others, Alan Gibbard, Stephen Darwall, and John Skorupski. Their ambition is to offer a non-circular analysis of the concept of moral wrongness in terms of blameworthiness. While these views have been criticized on various grounds, it has not (...) generally been thought that they encounter difficulties accounting for moral excuses. Indeed, it is often that by including a disjunction in the analysans—for example, S’s A-ing is morally wrong if and only if S is either excused or blameworthy for A-ing—these analyses can adequately account for moral excuses. But in attempting to account for moral excuses, these views wind up being either false or circular. (shrink)

This article critically examines Busk's Democracy in Spite of the Demos, which critiques the “categorical imperative of democracy.” Although Busk effectively challenges the commitment to value-neutral democratic procedures as the foundation for legitimate law, his alternative, curtailing powerful interests ability to manipulate voters using “socially necessary delusions,” risks establishing elite rule. This article instead proposes basic liberal rights as the normative foundation for legitimate public order and militant democracy as its most effective institutional safeguard, arguing that this combination better realizes (...) human emancipation. (shrink)

This article responds to four critics of Democracy in Spite of the Demos and reiterates its central thesis. Christopher Holman and Théophile Pénigaud attempt to maintain the critical value of democracy by invoking different elements of the deliberative tradition, while Benjamin Schupmann answers my charges by appealing to a strong liberal constitutionalism. I argue that these attempts repeat the ambivalence described and criticized in the book: democracy is taken as an end in itself, but with asterisks that introduce conditions (...) and qualifications. As long as democracy is only desirable given certain caveats, the critical weight is placed on these caveats and not on the figure of democracy. Andrew Norris takes a different approach, interrogating the book’s use of ideology critique and the concept of “socially necessary delusion.” This intervention presents difficulties to the concluding suggestion of the book, but I maintain that that these difficulties can be productive and generative rather than limiting or prohibitive. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Catharine Macaulay's Republican Enlightenment by Karen GreenAlan CoffeeKaren Green. Catharine Macaulay's Republican Enlightenment. London: Routledge, 2020. Pp. 276. Hardback, $160.00.Though she was once one of the most recognizable and celebrated public intellectuals in Britain and was read avidly in both revolutionary America and France, after her death in 1791, Catharine Macaulay's work fell into almost total obscurity for around two hundred years. This began to change in the (...) 1990s, since which time interest in Macaulay from historians, philosophers, and feminist scholars has gathered pace. In the last decade and a half, no one has likely done more to advance this scholarship than Karen Green, who has published numerous journal articles and book chapters probing deeply into Macaulay's thought and intellectual context, and who helpfully edited The Correspondence of Catharine Macaulay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), which had not previously been easily available to readers. As one would expect, Green's Catharine Macaulay's Republican Enlightenment builds on this depth of research. For a relatively slim volume, this is the most complete and detailed intellectual biography of Macaulay that I know of, an impressive feat given Macaulay's voluminous output.The aims of the book are twofold: first, to provide a narrative biography following Macaulay's life and the development of her works as they unfolded across her life, and second, to offer an overview and exposition of her ideas in their social and political context (4). These aims are important to bear in mind, since they establish what the book [End Page 158] is able to do and what it stops short of giving us. The volume is organized chronologically, divided into seven main chapters, each representing a short period in Macaulay's life, with an introduction and concluding chapter that considers her legacy, bringing the total chapters to nine. In each of the substantive chapters, Green mixes a biographical account of Macaulay's life with an often detailed analysis of one or more of her main works written during that period, as well as an assessment of how these works both engaged with, and were received within, some of the political and intellectual debates at the time. This is expertly done, with Green drawing on her intimate acquaintance with Macaulay's correspondence with many of the key figures of the period. The book, therefore, would make an excellent companion to anyone reading through the Correspondence as well as for those studying any of Macaulay's historical volumes, treatises, and tracts.An especially strong aspect of Green's book is the way she weaves an ongoing dialogue between Macaulay and several influential figures from her intellectual world across the chapters. One of these is David Hume, who, like Macaulay, had written an ideologically situated—even if both authors claimed impartiality—multivolume History of England. Though Hume's series was completed before Macaulay's had begun, hers can be seen as a philosophical and political rival to his. While the two would only correspond directly once on the subject, Green compares the impact that their respective philosophies have on their resulting political positions. In the 1760s, Green argues, Hume's naturalism, empiricism, and skepticism gave rise to a social conservative politics, whereas Macaulay's theological rationalism provided the basis for her optimistic and radical politics (50). By the 1790s, however, when Macaulay was writing her Letters on Education, Green detects some elements of a Humean philosophy of mind coming to influence Macaulay, albeit likely through David Hartley, particularly concerning the importance of sympathy on our moral psychology, even if there remain important differences between them (180–82). Green also analyzes Macaulay's engagement with Thomas Hobbes in her Loose Remarks and her two formal Observations on writings by Edmund Burke. Of particular value to historians of republicanism is Green's tracing and examination of Macaulay's ongoing intellectual relationship with key political figures, such as John Wilkes in Britain; Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Rush, John and Abigail Adams, James Otis, Mercy Otis Warren, and George Washington in America; Anne-Robert Jacques Turgot and Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville in France, among many others. Though Macaulay's reputation as an influential political writer... (shrink)

Leo Strauss's readings of historical figures in the philosophical tradition have been justly well explored; however, his relation to contemporary thinkers has not enjoyed the same coverage. In Leo Strauss and Contemporary Thought, an international group of scholars examines the possible conversations between Strauss and figures such as Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Charles Taylor, and Hans Blumenberg. The contributors examine topics including religious liberty, the political function of comedy, law, and the relation between the Ancients and the (...) Moderns, and bring Strauss into many new and original discussions that will be of use to those interested in the thought of Strauss, the history of philosophy and political theory, and contemporary continental thought"--Back cover. (shrink)

Din-bilim ilişkisi tarihsel süreçte olduğu gibi günümüzde de tartışılmaya devam etmektedir. Hristiyan Avrupa’sında ortaya çıkan tartışmaların İslam dünyasını da etkilediği bir vakıadır. İslam kelamcıları, İslam dini ile bilim arasında bir çatışmanın olmadığı genel kabulüyle hareket ederler. Özellikle bu noktada kelamın vesâil alanı, metafiziğin desteklendiği alan olarak kabul görmektedir. Modern dönemde vesâil alanında önemli bilimsel çalışmaların olduğu görülmektedir bunlardan biri de Nöroteolojidir. Nöroteoloji, davranışı nöral (sinirsel) temelde inceleyip açıklamaya çalışan bilim dalıdır. Bu noktada özellikle dindarlığın nörolojik temelleri ve evrimsel işlevi (...) hakkında önemli bilgiler sunmaktadır. Bu çalışmada kelamın en önemli tartışma konularından biri olan kesb nazariyesi, Nöroteolojik açıdan Benjamin libet deneyiyle değerlendirilmektedir. Deney sonuçları yayınlandığında o güne kadar felsefe ve bilim dünyasında tartışılagelen insanın irade özgürlüğü meselesine yeni bir tartışma zemini hazırlamıştır. Özellikle Eş’ârî’nin kesb anlayışının da ciddi tartışmalara sebebiyet verdiği bilinmektedir. Allah’ın mutlaklığı açısından ele alınan bu düşünce, insan özgürlüğü ve sorumluluğunu ortadan kaldırır düşüncesiyle eleştirilmiştir. Ancak Benjamin libet deneyinin, Eş’ârî’nin kesb anlayışına uygun veriler içermesi dikkat çeken bir husus olarak göze çarpmaktadır. (shrink)

In this book Alexander García Düttman explores and expands the works of Heidegger, Rosenzweig, Adorno, Benjamin, and Derrida. Out of his very fresh and pointed re-reading, he uncovers a peculiar correspondence of obsessions, interests, and priorities between these diverse twentieth century philosophies, And from these discoveries Düttman details a singular philosophical theory of memory and promise. Düttman's methodology is as groundbreaking as his discoveries, Alan Udoff writes: "This is not an exposition in the conventional sense: a scholarly, historical (...) report, with some attempt at criticism, Rather, it is at every turn a thinking through of certain texts, a thinking that, in putting questions to the texts... reveals or releases what is... stored in those texts." Düttman's questions are so philosophically and theologically penetrating that the reader is set out in new direction of thinking. While Düttman's book helps the reader achieve a new understanding of the gift of language in the works of Adorno, Benjamin, Heidegger, and Rosenzweig, his study also is fraught with implications for reading Derrida, Deleuze, Levinas and Lyotard. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Callimachus in Context: From Plato to the Augustan Poets by Benjamin Acosta-Hughes, Susan A. StephensIvana PetrovicBenjamin Acosta-Hughes and Susan A. Stephens. Callimachus in Context: From Plato to the Augustan Poets. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012. xvi + 328 pp. 4 maps. Cloth, $99.Callimachus is a scholar’s poet, not just because his poetry is difficult and challenging, but also because we tend to see a reflection of ourselves (...) in him: self-assured to the point of arrogance, delighting in recondite words and fun facts, a target of unfair criticism from malevolent and envious colleagues. Callimachus was for decades perceived as antiquarian, bookish, a scholar whose poetry was divorced from the performative setting, not championing civic values, but rather l’art pour l’art avant la lettre. The main focus of scholarship used to be Callimachus’ relationship with the Greek poetic tradition, and virtuoso studies in intertextuality demonstrated just how rich and wide-ranging the tapestry of his allusions is, from poetry to technical writings in prose. However, in the last couple of decades, this image of Callimachus as the ivory-tower scholar-poet began to change. In his ground-breaking monograph Callimachus and His Critics (Princeton 1995), Alan Cameron argued that Callimachus was a prominent and active figure at the Alexandrian court, and far from an armchair intellectual.In recent years, numerous scholars have looked into the way Callimachus was indeed a child of his own time. Brill’s 2011 Companion to Callimachus (edited by the authors of the present book and Luigi Lehnus) is a good illustration of the current state of affairs in Callimachus scholarship: six out of twenty-seven papers discuss Callimachus’ relationship with the royal family and explore his status as a court-poet, his attitude to contemporary religion, and the geopoetics of his poetry and its political implications.This book is a successful union of the two aforementioned approaches to the poet. First, the authors set out to “contextualize Callimachus within his intellectual traditions and within his physical and social environments”; second, they pose five questions: “Why do there appear to be so many Platonic tangents in Callimachus? Why, in a poet considered the model of the ‘bookish’ author, are there so many indications of poetic performance? What is the rapport between the Ptolemies and their political interests and a remarkably diffuse body of work of one court poet? Why is Callimachus an ongoing feature of Roman poetic culture, and in such a particular way?” (viii). They provide an answer to each of these questions in separate chapters, carefully and meticulously negotiating between the study of intertexts and Callimachus’ social contexts.The introduction is fast-paced and fact-based. It provides an overview of Callimachus’ career and the political and cultural history of his native city, Cyrene, and his adopted home, Alexandria. It is the choice of facts and the sharp eye for detail that sets this section apart from a mere collection of data: by discussing the poetic production of the lesser-known Cyrenaean epic poet Eugamon, the authors provide “a glimpse into regional poetics and how it operated within the broader Panhellenic context” (6); careful reading of inscriptions and an assessment of the archaeological remains allows them to offer an interesting suggestion regarding [End Page 365] the dramatic performances of dithyrambic choruses in connection with the festival of the Carneia, which Callimachus memorably described in his Hymn to Apollo.A succinct discussion of Cyrenaean cults brings together results of decades of archaeological study and allows material culture to inform and enrich our view of Callimachus’ poetry: there was a bronze Delian palm in the Cyrenaean sanctuary of Leto (cf. H. Ap. 1–2); the local temple of Zeus Olympius had a cult statue that replicated Phidias’ (cf. Iambus 6); Thesmophoria were probably celebrated in the Cyrenaen sanctuary of Demeter and Kore (cf. H. Dem.); a number of local statue-groups and reliefs coincide with figures in Callimachus’ poetry. By juxtaposing the old and venerable city Cyrene with the newly founded cosmopolitan Alexandria in Egypt, the authors emphasize the cultural contrast between Callimachus’ native city and his chosen home. Since Callimachus was a poet active in a city... (shrink)

The Variable and Permeable Filters metaphor is presented with an explanation of its advantages over other popular metaphors in accounting for attention effects in many different research paradigms. Research from laboratories of the author and others are discussed briefly and shown to result in diverse facilitatory and inhibitory attention effects on visual perception. All of these effects are consistent with the VAP-Filters metaphor.

The effect of nontargets on the identification of targets in the location-cuing paradigm was investigated in order to determine whether observers consistently allocate their attention to a validly cued location and whether the effect of nontargets is to facilitate or to inhibit performance. In four experiments, the effects of a single matching nontarget or a single nonmatching nontarget were compared. In each experiment, it was shown that observers consistently allocate their attention to a cued location when a precue appears and (...) that performance is inhibited more by nonmatching nontargets in the display than it is facilitated by matching nontargets. (shrink)

Endogenous and exogenous processes of attention have been inferred with different types of precues used in allocation of attention to a target location. In the present research, a comparison was made between the typical peripheral single-element precue (SEP), a central precue, and a multiple-element precue (MEP) in order to further understanding of the processes involved in allocation of attention. Two precues were used on each trial in these experiments. An abrupt-onset precue appeared with an SEP, an MEP, or a central (...) precue and was followed 50 or 300 ms later by a screen containing a target and two distractor characters. The abrupt-onset precue and the other precue each could be valid or invalid in indicating the location of the target, as in the study by Juola, Koshino, and Warner (1995). Response times to the targets showed that validity effects of the abrupt-onset precue and the MEP or central precue were additive, whereas those of the abrupt-onset precue and the SEP were interactive. These data suggest that, like a central precue, an MEP is an endogenous precue that guides conscious control of attention and has its attentional effects at a different processing level from an SEP, which is an exogenous precue and may compete for attentional resources with an abrupt-onset precue. (shrink)

This article is concerned with a puzzle that arises from three initially plausible assumptions that form an inconsistent triad: (i) Epistemic reasons are normative reasons (normativism); (ii) reasons are normative only if conformity with them is good (the reasons/value‐link); (iii) conformity with epistemic reasons need not be good (the nihilist assumption). I start by defending the reasons/value‐link, arguing that normativists need to reject the nihilist assumption. I then argue that the most familiar view that denies the nihilist assumption—epistemic teleology—is untenable. (...) Finally, I consider two alternative ways of accounting for the goodness of conformity with epistemic reasons: it may be good because it accords with the virtue of reasons‐responsiveness, and it may be good because it is good to conform with normative reasons as such. I argue that both of these conceptions avoid the problems of epistemic teleology and merit serious consideration as potential solutions to the puzzle. (shrink)

This entry is composed of three sections. In §1, we survey debates about what structural rationality is, including the emergence of the concept in the contemporary literature, its key characteristics, its relationship to substantive rationality, its paradigm instances, and the questions of whether these instances are unified and, if so, how. In §2, we turn to the debate about structural requirements of rationality – including controversies about whether they are “wide-scope” or “narrow-scope”, synchronic or diachronic, and whether they govern processes (...) or states; as well as examining various forms of skepticism about structural requirements of rationality. In §3, we turn to the debate about the normative significance of structural rationality, surveying central challenges for the view that structural rationality is normatively significant and the theoretical options that arise in light of these challenges. (shrink)

The main contribution of this paper is a novel account of ontological dependence. While dependence is often explained in terms of modality and existence, there are relations of dependence that slip through the mesh of such an account. Starting from an idea proposed by Jonathan Lowe, the article develops an account of ontological dependence based on a notion of explanation; on its basis, certain relations of dependence can be established that cannot be accounted by the modal-existential account. Dependence is only (...) one of two main topics of this paper, for it is approached via a discussion of the category of substance. On a traditional view, substances can be characterised as independent entities. Before the background of a modal-existential account of dependence, this idea appears problematic. The proposed notion of explanatory dependence is shown to vindicate the traditional approach to substance. (shrink)

According to the Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, the norms by which everyday human cognition is best evaluated are probabilistic rather than logical in character. Recently, the Bayesian paradigm has been applied to the domain of argumentation, where the fundamental norms are traditionally assumed to be logical. Here, we present a major generalisation of extant Bayesian approaches to argumentation that (i)utilizes a new class of Bayesian learning methods that are better suited to modelling dynamic and conditional inferences than (...) standard Bayesian conditionalization, (ii) is able to characterise the special value of logically valid argument schemes in uncertain reasoning contexts, (iii) greatly extends the range of inferences and argumentative phenomena that can be adequately described in a Bayesian framework, and (iv) undermines some influential theoretical motivations for dual function models of human cognition. We conclude that the probabilistic norms given by the Bayesian approach to rationality are not necessarily at odds with the norms given by classical logic. Rather, the Bayesian theory of argumentation can be seen as justifying and enriching the argumentative norms of classical logic. (shrink)

Chance both guides our credences and is an objective feature of the world. How and why we should conform our credences to chance depends on the underlying metaphysical account of what chance is. I use considerations of accuracy (how close your credences come to truth-values) to propose a new way of deferring to chance. The principle I endorse, called the Trust Principle, requires chance to be a good guide to the world, permits modest chances, tells us how to listen to (...) chance even when the chances are modest, and entails but is not entailed by the New Principle. As I show, a rational agent will obey this principle if and only if she expects chance to be at least as accurate as she is on every good way of measuring accuracy. Much of the discussion, and the technical results, extend beyond chance to deference to any kind of expert. Indeed, you will trust someone about a particular question just in case you expect that person to be more accurate than you are about that question. (shrink)

While the objects of olfaction are intuitively individuated by reference to the ordinary objects from which they arise, this intuition does not accurately capture the complex nature of smells. Smells are neither ordinary three-dimensional objects, nor Platonic vapors, nor odors. Rather, smells are the molecular structures of chemical compounds within odor plumes. Molecular Structure Theory is offered as an account of smells, which can explain the nature of the external object of olfactory perception, what we experience as olfactory objects, and (...) what determines the olfactory quality of smells by which we can demarcate the spatiotemporal boundaries of smells. (shrink)

Following Cass Sunstein's popular treatment of the concept, echo chambers are often defined as environments which exclude contrary opinions through omission. C. Thi Nguyen contests the popular usage and defines echo chambers in terms of in-group trust and out-group distrust. In this paper, I argue for a more comprehensive treatment. While both exclusion by omission and out-group distrust help sustain echo chambers, neither defines the phenomenon. I develop a social network model of echo chambers which focuses on the role of (...) belief-reinforcing echoes. First, I argue that the model allows us to incorporate Nguyen's main point about distrust without construing other commentators as deeply mistaken about the nature of echo chambers. Second, I use the model to develop an account of collaborative resistance and use it to clarify the role echo chambers play in spreading misinformation. (shrink)

If bioethical questions cannot be resolved in a widely acceptable manner by rational argument, and if they can be regulated only on the basis of political decision-making, then bioethics belongs to the political sphere. The particular kind of politics practiced in any given society matters greatly: it will determine the kind of bioethical regulation, legislation, and public policy generated there. I propose approaching bioethical questions politically in terms of decisions that cannot be “correct” but that can be “procedurally legitimate.” Two (...) procedures in particular can deliver legitimate bioethical decisions, once combined: expert bioethics committees and deliberative democracy. Bioethics so understood can exceed bioethics as a moral project or as a set of administrative principles to regulate medical practice; it can now aspire to a democratic project that involves ordinary citizens as far as reasonably possible. I advance this argument in four steps: (1) using the example of human germline gene editing, (2) I propose a general understanding of proceduralism, and (3) then combine two types and (4) conclude with a defense of majoritarian proceduralism. I develop this argument in terms of one example: germline gene editing. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps, and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may (...) freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Wilson et al. focus on one class of AGL tasks: the cognitively demanding task of detecting non‐adjacent dependencies (NADs) among items. They provide a typology of the different types of NADs in natural languages and in AGL tasks. A range of cues affect NAD learning, ranging from the variability and number of intervening elements to the presence of shared prosodic cues between the dependent items. These cues, important for humans to discover non‐adjacent dependencies, are also found to facilitate NAD learning (...) in several nonhuman animal species. (shrink)

According to the Balancing View of Ought, we ought to perform an action if and only if performing the action is most strongly supported by the balance of our reasons. The Balancing View faces the objection from exclusionary reasons, which are second-order reasons not to act for certain other reasons. According to Joseph Raz, the existence of exclusionary reasons undermines the Balancing View: a reason might tip the balance in favour of performing an act but at the same time be (...) excluded by an undefeated second-order reason, in which case one ought not conform to the balance of reasons. I argue that the Balancing View can be defended against this objection and that the existence of exclusionary reasons is compatible with the Balancing View. (shrink)

Reductive representationalist theories of consciousness are yet to produce a satisfying account of pain’s affective component, the part that makes it painful. The paramount problem here is that that there seems to be no suitable candidate for what affective experience represents. This article suggests that affective experience represents the Darwinian fitness effects of events. I argue that, because of affective experience’s close association with motivation, natural selection will work to bring affect into covariance with the average fitness effects of types (...) of event, and that this covariance makes fitness effects a promising candidate for what affect represents. I also argue that this account is to be preferred to Cutter and Tye’s recent proposal that affect represents harmfulness, and answer an objection that Aydede and Fulkerson recently offered against representational accounts of affect. (shrink)

A broad set of public policy debates concern the limits of humanity’s control over nature. Attitudes towards such topics are not well explained by the standard 2-dimensional political model favored by political scientists of i) a left/right economic spectrum and ii) a liberal/authoritarian social spectrum. I pose a new, orthogonal, political spectrum to fill the void. It is a spectrum of value held for, on the one hand, nature, and on the other, technological progress. This harks back to the 18th (...) Century Enlightenment and Romanticism, but manifests again and again, including in recent debates about human enhancement biotechnology. (shrink)

Sheds new light on Heidegger's early theological development.

I argue that you can be permitted to discount the interests of your adversaries even though doing so would be impartially suboptimal. This means that, in addition to the kinds of moral options that the literature traditionally recognises, there exist what I call other-sacrificing options. I explore the idea that you cannot discount the interests of your adversaries as much as you can favour the interests of your intimates; if this is correct, then there is an asymmetry between negative partiality (...) toward your adversaries and positive partiality toward your intimates. (shrink)

In this paper we motivate the ‘principles of trust’, chance-credence principles that are strictly stronger than the New Principle yet strictly weaker than the Principal Principle, and argue, by proving some limitative results, that the principles of trust conflict with Humean Supervenience.

Thomas Kroedel argues that the lottery paradox can be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility rather than epistemic obligation. According to his permissibility solution, we are permitted to believe of each lottery ticket that it will lose, but since permissions do not agglomerate, it does not follow that we are permitted to have all of these beliefs together, and therefore it also does not follow that we are permitted to believe that all tickets will lose. I present two (...) objections to this solution. First, even if justification itself amounts to no more than epistemic permissibility, the lottery paradox recurs at the level of doxastic obligations unless one adopts an extremely permissive view about suspension of belief that is in tension with our practice of doxastic criticism. Second, even if there are no obligations to believe lottery propositions, the permissibility solution fails because epistemic permissions typically agglomerate, and the lottery case provides no exception to this rule. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the relationship between physical quantities and physical states in quantum theories. I argue against the claim made by Arageorgis that the approach to interpreting quantum theories known as Algebraic Imperialism allows for “too many states.” I prove a result establishing that the Algebraic Imperialist has very general resources that she can employ to change her abstract algebra of quantities in order to rule out unphysical states.